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In Brazil, Rio de Janeiro is 
commonly referred to as the 
“marvelous city.” Surrounded by the 
ocean and steep hills covered in green, 
the city has always been the postcard 
of the country. Rio, the second largest 
city in Brazil, is also a large economic 
center, and features some of the most 
expensive real estate in the country. 
However, Rio is also a city of contrasts 
and inequalities. Approximately 
20 percent of its population lives 
in favelas, a type of shantytown.1 
These people live a life surrounded 
by violence from both State and non-
State actors resulting in what Michael 
Taussig, in his study of rubber trade in 
the Putumayo, calls a “space of terror.”2 
However, these areas did not become 
spaces of terror by accident, they are 
the product of a historical process 
that elaborated ways of creating a 
certain stability for the upper classes 
in a country with extreme levels of 
economic inequality. 
The Brazilian government often 
argues that the violence used inside 
the favelas is necessary to combat 
drug dealers. However, the methods 
employed by the police, such as 
general search warrants that allow 
them to invade any house,3 hardly 
differentiate between innocent favela 
residents and criminals. Therefore, 
a series of questions needs to be 
considered. What kind of violence 
does the State use against favela 
residents? What are the effects of this 
violence? What legitimizes violence 
against this specific segment of 
society? Louis Althusser’s concepts 
of Repressive and Ideological State 
Apparatuses4 are helpful tools 
to understand the situation. The 
police in Rio works as part of the 
Repressive State Apparatus (RSA), 
while other institutions, especially the 
media, function as Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISA) that legitimize 
an ideology that tolerates, and 
even encourages, violence against 
a specific group of subalterns: the 
favela residents. The methods used 
by the police can be qualified as state 
terrorism, which, according to Jefferey 
Sluka, another theorist of State 
terrorism, “refers to the use or threat 
of violence by the state or its agents 
or supporters, particularly against 
civilian individuals and populations 
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as a means of political intimidation 
and control.”5 The terrorism carried 
out by the State helps sustains a 
space of terror that contributes to the 
marginalization of these communities 
and suppresses their political power, 
thus preserving a status quo plagued 
by inequalities.
FAVELAS: MARGINALIZED SPACES
The favelas began to appear 
along the hills of Rio de Janeiro in the 
end of the 19th century. At first the 
government attempted to eliminate 
them, but eventually it began to take 
action to urbanize these areas.6 The 
urbanization project had limited 
success and today these shantytowns 
are located alongside upper-class 
neighborhoods. Compared to the rest 
of the city, residents from the favelas 
have always been underserved or 
excluded from state services such as 
education, sanitation, health care and 
security. The absence of the State in 
these areas leaves a vacuum that was 
occupied by drug traffickers, who now 
base their operations from the hills 
and sell drugs in lower areas of the 
favelas that border the urbanized city. 
These spots are called bocas (mouths) 
and are accessible to the upper 
classes. The traffickers are organized 
into factions that fight amongst 
themselves for control of different 
favelas and bocas and who fight the 
State to maintain what in turn is a very 
profitable business. The majority of 
the favela population is stuck between 
these various conflicts.7
Because of these contrasts binary 
oppositions have appeared contrasting 
the urbanized city with the favelas – 
the most common being morro (hill) 
to refer to the favelas and asfalto 
(asphalt) to refer to the city. People 
from each of these environments rarely 
socialize with one another; one of the 
major exceptions being instances of 
crime. The lack of social interaction 
results on the marginalization of favela 
residents. They are habitually referred 
to as favelados, a pejorative term. The 
word favelado often evokes the image 
of a black man, probably in his early 
twenties and dressed in shabby clothes, 
thus adding a racial component to the 
situation. There is a strong narrative of 
Brazil as a “racial democracy,” which 
only recently has been undergoing 
criticism.8 Even though Brazil is a 
highly miscegenated country – and the 
favelas a diversified space – in urban 
centers a majority of black people live 
in these shantytowns. This is due to 
Brazil’s modernization project, which 
failed “to incorporate large segments 
of the population into modern sectors 
of the economy, society, and political 
system” and resulted on the exclusion 
of these social groups from certain 
rights and services guaranteed by the 
government.9 Therefore, the situation 
in Rio and other urban centers in Brazil 
can be defined as social apartheid; 
large segments of the population 
are concentrated in a certain area 
and excluded from certain rights. 
Even though for the most part the 
favelas are not walled-off, the police 
sometimes establish checkpoints to 
search for drugs and weapons. Also, 
the rich have built walls with electric 
fences around their condominiums. 
The division between favelas and 
other spaces is clearly defined and it 
is the side on which one is situated in 
that determines his or hers identity. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARIZED 
POLICE
The Brazilian police system 
is divided into three forces, each 
of them having a specific function. 
However, instead of creating a more 
efficient police, this specialization 
fosters animosity and results in an 
increased use of illegal violence in the 
competition for criminals.10 Today, the 
role of the federal police (PF) is mostly 
reduced to patrolling the borders 
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and dealing with immigration.  The 
civil police (PC) are non-uniformed 
and exert a juridical role by running 
criminal investigations. The 
militarized police (PM) are uniformed 
and work to prevent and intervene 
with any crimes taking place. The PM 
patrols the streets and usually makes 
the arrests, once an arrest is made the 
criminal proceeding is passed to the 
PC. 
Because of the nature of the 
PM’s work, it is the force usually 
engaged in visible conflict and that is 
in constant contact with the civilian 
population. The PM is subordinate to 
the military, making its organization 
highly hierarchical and adopting 
military practices and procedures.11 
The training is organized like boot 
camp, preparing for war instead of 
civil policing.12 Furthermore, crimes 
committed by militarized police 
officers are not dealt with by the civil 
justice system, but by military justice; 
a process that “weaken[s] the rule of 
law, extends the impunity and violence 
of the military police in dealing with 
the civilian population and indirectly 
assures them wide latitude for 
arbitrary behavior.”13
All of this constitutes what Jorge 
Zaverucha calls an “institutional 
hybrid,”14 in which public safety 
becomes militarized, defined by a 
military discourse and dealt through 
military tactics. In Brazil, public 
safety is still understood through 
the prism of the ideologically 
legitimized violence of the old military 
dictatorship, but now the war on 
crime has replaced the war against 
subversives. The police, the media 
and politicians use the war discourse, 
referring to a “war on drugs” or a “war 
on crime.” This discourse helps shape 
the criminal into an enemy that needs 
to be eliminated and legitimizes a “by 
any means necessary” position.15  As 
Benoni Belli states: 
From what it appears, the military 
organization of the PM reinforces the 
ideology of the delinquent as enemy, 
since	 at	 the	 police	 officer	 enters	 an	
organization that trains for war. The 
deaths, which should be discouraged, 
are calculated as acts of bravery, 
with little consideration that the 
confrontation could have been avoided 
with some kind of negotiation. There 
is no space for negotiation in the 
battlefield.16
These acts of bravery are 
rewarded either through promotion 
or salary increase.17
It is from within this institutional 
framework that the abuse of violence 
by the police is internally legitimized. 
In 2007, the police in Rio de Janeiro 
killed at least 1,260 people and “all 
were officially categorized as ‘acts of 
resistance’ and underwent little or no 
serious investigation.”18 The number 
is even more alarming because on 
average the number of estimated 
police homicides is more than double 
the number of reported police 
homicides.19
    
THE POLICE INSIDE THE FAVELAS
Abuse of violence by the part of 
the police reaches its highest extremes 
inside the favelas. Because of the 
presence of drug traffickers, the favelas 
are perceived as the locus of crime and 
violence in Rio. Even though only 1 to 
3 percent of the population in these 
areas is involved in drug trafficking, 
police operations effectively target all 
residents.20 As Amnesty International 
reports: 
Policing in Rio de Janeiro continues to be 
characterized by large-scale operations 
in which heavily armed police units 
‘invade’ favelas only to pull out once 
the operation has been completed. […] 
Damage to property and infrastructure, 
the closure of businesses and curfew-
like conditions preventing people from 
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going to work and studying, impose 
financial	and	social	costs	long	after	the	
operation is over.21
These sweeping actions are 
justified by blurry distinctions 
between criminals and residents. 
As an example, “marginal” is a term 
commonly used to refer to criminals 
but that is also used pejoratively 
against favela residents. Marginal 
is an example of all-encompassing 
categories that fail to distinguish 
between very different groups. It 
associates criminality to poverty 
and encourages the same methods 
– violence and repression – to deal 
with what in turn are very different 
social phenomena. Through this use 
of language the drug dealers and the 
poor become one in the same. 
Favelas and their residents 
have always been defined as social 
problems lacking in material goods 
and civility. This view constructs 
these populations as dangerous 
and criminal; a homogenizing 
perspective of what is actually a very 
heterogeneous environment.22 The 
general view of the favela is that it is 
located in the fringes of modernity. 
Small unpainted houses, visible wiring 
illegally sucking electricity from 
other areas, narrow and unorganized 
streets, precarious sewage system 
and high population density all 
contribute to the image of the favela 
as a space between civilization and 
nature; a place where violence is 
inherent.23 When the PM carries out 
its aggressive operations inside the 
favelas it reproduces the image of the 
favela as a wretched environment. 
When the media describe shootouts 
and release the number of casualties 
it provides the rest of the city with an 
image they can oppose themselves to: 
the asfalto is civilized while the morro 
is primitive. The upper classes adopt 
a perverted Hobbesian perspective24 
in which favela residents are located 
in a degenerated state of nature and 
in a constant state of bellum omnium 
contra omnes. The issue, however, is 
that in this context the violence does 
not actually occur in a “state of nature.” 
Much of it is actually conducted by 
“civilization” – by the Brazilian State.       
    
BOPE: THE EMBODIMENT OF TERROR
The Special Police Operations 
Battalion (BOPE) functions as an 
agent of terror on behalf of the State. 
The BOPE is the elite force of the PM 
and is infamous for its widespread use 
of torture, disrespect for human rights 
and summary executions.25 It was 
created to invade enemy territories, 
not for policing.26 Its status as an 
elite force serves as a justification 
for its violent character. Whereas 
the conventional police in Brazil – 
the PM, PC and PF – are considered 
to be very corrupt, the BOPE is seen 
as incorruptible. Elite da Tropa, a 
fictionalized27 account of everyday life 
inside the BOPE, provides some insight 
as to why incorruptibility is such an 
important theme in the organization’s 
ethics: 
What is the antidote for the corruption? 
In the BOPE’s history, the answer 
was only one: pride. Personal and 
professional pride. Respect for the 
black uniform. Death before dishonor. 
The	 selection	 process	 was	 so	 difficult	
and painful, the initiation ritual was so 
dramatic, that belonging became the 
most precious good. Being a member 
of the BOPE, sharing that identity, 
converted into the most valuable 
endowment. The self-esteem is priceless. 
Therefore it is nonnegotiable.28
Police morality and high-
mindedness nurture cohesion and 
justify the use of excessive force.29 
This is an even stronger factor 
inside the BOPE, whose training 
course is permeated with hazing and 
humiliation. The process is so intense 
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that only 14 out of 58 candidates 
graduated out of an August 2008 
training course.30 The result of such a 
process is high levels of unity and pride 
within the group. The group sees itself 
so highly that it refers to other police 
forces as pés-de-cão (dog’s feet) and is 
highly critical of their corruption.31
Images of terror are pervasive 
throughout the BOPE’s symbols. Its 
logo, which stamps the organization’s 
uniforms and vehicles, is a skull 
with a knife going through the top 
superimposed over two crossed 
handguns. The message is clear: they 
are carriers of terror and death. This 
message is reinforced by the word 
used to refer to BOPE officers: caveira 
(skeleton). Terror is also explicit in the 
exercise songs the officers sing:
    
 
The “black” refers to the uniform, 
which distinguishes them from the 
ordinary police and at the same time 
gives them a death squad aspect. Also, 
in the songs there is no distinguishing 
between criminals and innocent 
people; the objective is to spread 
terror and death throughout the favela. 
Since the BOPE acts almost exclusively 
inside the favelas the upper classes are 
not affected by these images of terror.
A BOPE instrument that has 
grown notorious is the caveirão 
(big skull) – “a security van that has 
been adapted into military-style 
assault vehicle,” including a rotating 
turret.34 The government claims the 
caveirão is used to police the favelas 
and protect officers in dangerous 
missions. However, favela residents 
have reported several abuses, such 
as random firing and torture inside 
the vehicles.  Whenever the caveirão 
starts roaming through the favela, 
intimidations such as “We have 
come to take your souls”35 are issued 
through its loudspeakers. For the 
favela resident, the caveirão is literally 
a vehicle of terror announcing its 
presence to all those it might encounter, 
regardless if they have broken the law 
or not. The caveirão has become such 
an agent of terror that it has colonized 
the imaginary of favela residents. In 
children, “the innocent fear of the 
‘bogeyman’ has been replaced by that 
of the caveirão.”36 Thus, state terrorism 
proves to have a pervasive effect – by 
entering the subconscious it ceases 
to be just a then and there experience 
and acquires a supernatural character 
impossible to evade. Even when there 
is no conflict involving the police or 
drug dealers, the resident is always 
living with the fear that something 
could happen at any time.
THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE AND 
TERROR IN THE FAVELAS
 The violence and terror 
employed inside the favelas have 
tangible effects. People who live in 
the favelas are already alienated 
from the political process because 
of the poverty and social exclusion 
they experience. Because the political 
world is inaccessible to them, many 
withdraw into the private sphere and 
internalize a sense of inferiority.37
Violence has made matters worse. 
When she returned to Rio in 2001 to 
relocate the people she had studied 
and reassess the findings of her 1976 
book The Myth of Marginality: Urban 
Poverty and Politics in Rio De Janeiro, 
Janice Perlman discovered that what 
Homem de preto,
Qual é sua 
missão?
É invadir favela
E deixar corpo no 
chão.
Se perguntas de 
onde venho
E qual é minha 
missão





What is your 
mission?
It’s to invade 
favela[s]
And leave bodies 
on the ground
If you ask where I 
come from
And what is my 
mission





had changed the most in favelas was a 
drastic increase in fear:38
This fear diminishes the use of public 
space, leads to less socializing among 
friends and relatives, fewer memberships 
in community organizations, less sense 
of trust and less networking. […] People 
feel trapped between the drug dealers 
and the police. They feel the police 
does more harm and provides less help 
than the drug dealers, but see both as 
disrespectful of life in the community.39
This argument is supported by 
the fact that membership in resident’s 
associations has fallen from 28 
percent in 1968 to only 3 percent in 
2001.40 The fact that the police are just 
as feared as drug dealers – if not more 
– is indicative of their problematic 
presence. For favela residents they 
are not part of the solution, but an 
essential component in creating a 
space of terror.
The space of terror in the favelas 
is so pervasive that it functions as a 
barrier to combat that terror. When 
residents from a  favela allied with 
Amnesty International and other 
groups to organize a campaign 
against the caveirão, fear was the 
main obstacle to acquiring a large 
number of signatures and significant 
participation.41 Terror proves to be 
such an efficient tactic because it is 
difficult to get through the fear and 
develop forms of challenging it. The 
transformation of favelas into spaces of 
terror serves as a restraint against the 
political mobilization of residents from 
those areas. Whereas social exclusion 
from the outside prevents favela 
residents from being assimilated into 
political life, fear serves as a deterrent 
against internal organization and 
mobilization. Perhaps the most telling 
insight comes from an interview Hélio 
Luz, a former chief of the PC in Rio, 
gave in the documentary Notícias de 
uma Guerra Particular:
The police are corrupt. I mean: the 
institution that exists is an institution 
that was created to be violent and 
corrupt. And people question: “Why was 
it created to be violent and corrupt?” 
The police was made to provide security 
to the state and the elite. I work with a 
politic	 of	 repression	 in	 benefit	 of	 the	
State for the protection of the State.42
The argument that police works 
in benefit of the “elite” is supported by 
the way the different ways it interacts 
with the lower and upper classes:
Burglaries are well investigated when 
upper-class residences are robbed. 
Upper-class people may pay the police 
for having stolen property returned; 
they may also ask the police to ‘be 
tough’ (to torture) to get information. 
However, burglaries of poor people’s 
homes tend to be ignored.43
When combating crime the police 
works for the interests of the upper 
classes, and by spreading terror 
throughout the favelas it functions 
as a RSA. The police organization is 
required to maintain the control of 
political and economic forces in the 
hands of the upper classes. But even 
if that is so, how are tactics such as 
torture and summary executions– 
tactics usually condemned in 
democratic and open societies– 
legitimized?
IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 
AND THE LEGITIMIZATION OF 
VIOLENCE
Althusser proposes a basic 
difference between Repressive State 
Apparatuses and Ideological State 
Apparatuses: “The Repressive State 
Apparatus functions ‘by violence,’ 
whereas the Ideological State 
Apparatuses function ‘by ideology’.”44 
The police in Brazil, and in every State 
for that matter, are part of the RSA, 
whereas those institutions considered 
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to be “outside” of the State – such as 
the media, the family and religion – 
are ISAs. According to Althusser, even 
though these institutions are private 
they are still subordinate to “bourgeois 
law.” In Rio, ISAs legitimize an ideology 
that tolerates high levels of violence 
against favela residents. The following 
analysis will concentrate specifically 
on the role of the media as ISAs.
The first thing that needs to 
be taken into consideration is that 
in Rio the “if it bleeds, it leads” 
mentality is dominant; crime stories 
are a prominent element in media 
coverage. However, while newspapers, 
magazines, television and radio 
extensively cover crimes committed 
against the upper classes, crimes 
against the poor are for the most 
part ignored.45 Often crime stories 
involving upper-class victims take the 
form of dramatic personal narratives 
that focus on the life and suffering 
of the victim and his or her family. 
The coverage of the death of Jõao 
Hélio Fernandes Vieites in is useful in 
illustrating and discussing the issues 
with this kind of practice.
On February 7, 2007, three young 
men surrounded  a car in Rio in order 
to steal it. They ordered the people 
inside the vehicle to get out. Vieites’s 
mother, sister and a family friend all 
got out, but the robbers took off before 
Vieite was able to fully exit the car. As 
the robbers drove away, Vieite’s head 
was dragged against the asphalt until 
he finally died. The event resulted in 
an outcry from citizens, politicians 
and the media – the latter playing 
an aggressive role in demonizing 
the robbers and portraying the 
suffering of the victim’s family. The 
four men involved in the robbery 
and Vieite’s death were arrested the 
following day, among them a 16-year-
old. Immediately calls for severe 
punishment, including reducing the 
criminal age and the legalizing the 
death penalty, began to appear.  
Veja, the weekly newsmagazine 
with the highest circulation in Brazil, 
ran articles and editorials on the 
event portraying Vieite’s family’s 
pain and calling for harsher methods 
and penalties against criminals. A 
week after the crime occurred, Veja 
ran an article46 that referred to the 
men arrested as “monsters” and to 
Vieite as a “public martyr.” The article 
mocked those who argued that there 
are structural roots to criminality and 
stated that in Brazil it was criminals 
who decided who lived and who died. 
There were also photos of Vieite’s 
family crying at his funeral and of 
the police holding by the neck two 
of the men involved in the crime and 
a third that the story fails to identify, 
and exposing them to photographers 
as if they were trophies. The men in 
the photo fit the stereotype of favela 
residents: they are young, black and 
shirtless. Two of them have their 
eyes censored – a sign of them being 
underage – and the third’s genital 
is censored because it was exposed 
when the photo was taken. The image 
portrayed by the photograph is clear, 
these are animals that threaten 
civilization; they need to be controlled 
by any means necessary. Veja’s, goal 
was not to just cover the news – if 
it were so it would cover the daily 
murders inside the favelas – but to also 
influence public opinion in a certain 
direction. Pierre Bordieu elaborates 
on the consequences of this practice:
A perverse form of direct democracy 
can come into play when the media act 
in a way that is calculated to mobilize 
the public. Such “direct democracy” 
maximizes the effect both of the 
pressures working upon the media 
and of collective emotion. The usual 
buffers (not necessarily democratic) 
against the pressures are linked to 
the relative autonomy of the political 
field.	 Absent	 this	 autonomy,	 we	 are	
left with a revenge model, precisely 
46
the model against which the druidical 
and even political model of justice was 
established	in	the	first	place.	It	happens	
on occasions that, unable to maintain 
the	 distance	 necessary	 for	 reflection,	
journalists end up acting like the 
fireman	who	sets	the	fire.47
The treatment of Vieite’s death by 
the media is standard practice in Brazil. 
Editorials from large publications 
often try to mobilize public support 
for harsh measures against criminals, 
including violating human rights and 
instating the death penalty. These 
publications go as far as calling human 
rights privilege for criminals.48
The relationship between the 
media and the police are a clear 
example of the perverse interaction 
between the RSA and ISAs. The media 
publishes statistics provided by the 
police, and these are considered to 
be representative of reality. However, 
as was previously discussed, police 
actions are biased toward the upper 
classes. This results in “statistics 
overrepresent[ing] crimes in 
which the victim is upper-class and 
underrepresent[ing] those in which 
the victim is working-class.”49 The 
same is true for those who commit the 
crimes, with an overrepresentation 
of crimes committed by the poor. The 
media reproduces a distorted image 
of reality that supports the idea of 
violence being connected to poverty.
           
“TALKING CRIME”
Another very important aspect 
that needs to be considered regarding 
the support of violence in Brazilian 
society is what Teresa Caldeira calls 
“the talk of crime.”50 According to 
Caldeira talk of crime is contagious: 
one story is usually followed by 
someone else narrating his or her 
experience. It also orders the city – 
what areas and what types of people 
are dangerous and what interactions 
are allowed. When talking crime “the 
categories are rigid: they are meant not 
to describe the world accurately but to 
organize and classify it symbolically.”51 
The talk of crime reinterprets violence 
and tries to create order from what is 
in itself a disordering act. However, the 
order created is ultimately one that 
legitimizes violence:
The symbolic order engendered in the 
talk of crime not only discriminates 
against some groups, promotes their 
criminalization, and transforms them 
into victims of violence, but also makes 
fear circulate through the repetition of 
histories, and, more important, helps 
delegitimize the institutions of order 
and legitimize the use of private, violent, 
and illegal means of revenge. If the talk 
of crime promotes a resymbolization 
of violence, it does not by legitimizing 
legal violence to counteract illegal 
violence but by doing the opposite.52
The relationship between the 
talk of crime among the upper classes 
and the way the media portray 
violence is complementary. While 
the talk of crime consists primarily 
of personal anecdotes, the media’s 
narrative includes distorted statistics 
that supposedly represent the reality 
of the situation. The “objective” 
representation and the subjective 
experience reflect each other and reify 
the idea of criminality and violence 
being associated with the poor and 
stemming from the favelas. However, 
this idea does not correspond with 
reality – it represents the experience 
of only one side: the asfalto. Talk 
of crime and the media’s portrayal 
of violence create an environment 
among the upper classes in which 
fear ceases to be a natural reaction 
to violence and becomes the prism 
through which social problems are 
understood. The image of favela 
residents is slowly constructed into 
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that of savage criminals, and that 
legitimizes violence against them.
CONCLUSION
In a country where the top one 
percent of the population earns more 
than the lowest 50,53 different forms 
of control must be exerted so that the 
structure of inequalities can remain 
stable. Through repression the State 
“enables the ruling classes […] to 
ensure their domination over the 
working class.”54 In Rio the police are 
an essential component to the RSA. 
They do not work only to fight crime; 
the violence they use has the political 
function of preserving the status quo 
of inequalities. As Luz explained: “How 
do you keep two million inhabitants, 
who earn 112 Reais,55 when they do, 
under control? How do you keep all 
the underprivileged under control, 
calm? With repression.”56 The violent 
character the police take inside the 
favelas is not accidental, since the 
most pervasive form of repression 
is terror. As Michael Taussig notes, 
massive populations are controlled 
through the cultural elaboration of 
fear.57 Fear inhibits any significant 
form of resistance to the existing order 
from all sides. Inside the favelas people 
have internalized a sense of exclusion 
and are too scared to organize 
themselves. In the urbanized areas 
people experience violence through a 
specific narrative in which the locus of 
the problems is the favela. The favela 
is perceived as a place to be feared 
and to be dealt with by the harshest 
methods – any other alternative would 
risk enabling criminals. The upper 
classes support violence by the part of 
the State because they see it as a form 
of containing spaces of terror to the 
favelas. Fear, which exists both inside 
and outside the favelas in different 
forms, serves as a powerful insulator 
against any significant change in the 
unequal structures of society. 
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